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1.   Introduct i on
The  1990s have seen a grow i ng i nt erest  i n t he adopt i on of  “hard f i xed” exchange  r ates i n  LDCs   as a 
possibl e wa y   of  ma k i ng a credibl e c o mmi t me n t   t o a l ow  dom est i c i nfl ati on r ate ( Edwar ds,   1993).   An  
i r r evocable com m it me n t  to a fi xed exchange rate m ay hel p t o sol ve t he t i me  i nconsi stency probl em s 
r aised i n K ydl and and Pr escott   ( 1977)  and Ba r r o and Go r don ( 1983);   i t   ma y   also prevent  self-f ul f i l l i ng
curr ency cri ses ( Da v i es and Vi nes,   1995).   R ecent  r esearch i ndi cates t hat   count r i es t hat   have ma d e   a 
r eali sti c c o mmi t me n t   t o a f i xed exchange r ate pol i cy do have l ow er  average i nfl ati on r at es ( G hosh et
al . ,  1995;  A nyadi ke-Da n e s ,  1995;  Fi eldi ng and Bl eaney, 2000).  The r eali sm  of t h e  c o mmi t me n t  
depends on t he i nst i t ut i onal   f r am ew ork wi t hi n wh i ch t he exchange r ate i s f i xed.   I n t he r ecent  past   t he 
mo s t   successful   uni l ateral  att em pts t o adhere t o a f i xed exchange r ate have i nvol ved t he i nt r oduct i on 
of curr ency boards,  as for exam ple in A rgent i na or Es t oni a. Thi s has led to a renew ed int erest in 
curr ency boards  as a stabil i zati on  t ool   ( see f or  exam ple G hosh et  al . ,   1998;   Edwar ds,   1999).
The  credibi l i t y  of  c o mmi t me n t   t hat   com es wi t h  a curr ency board  r esult s f r om   t hat   f act  t hat   any 
deval uat i on  i s i m possibl e wi t hout   dest r oyi ng  t he  w hol e system .  Ho we v e r ,   t here are alt ernat i ve  wa y s   of 
gai ni ng credibi l i t y.   I n Af r i ca t he CFA  Fr anc Zone consi sts of  t wo   m onet ary  uni ons  bet w een di f f erent 
Af r i can states.  The  t wo   CFA  curr encies have been pegged t o t he Fr ench Fr anc ( and now  t he Eur o
1)
since 1948,   wi t h t he Fr ench t r easury guaranteeing t o exchange Fr ench curr ency f or  CFA  curr ency at 
a f i xed r ate ( Vi zy,  1989).   Thi s rate can be adjust ed f or  eit her  of  t he t wo   m onet ary uni ons,   but   onl y by 
t he  mu t ual   consent   of  all   t he  me mb e r s of  t he  uni on  and  Fr ance.  I n  f act,   t he  r ate has  been adjust ed onl y 
once,  i n January 1994.  T he system  preserves som e fl exibi l i t y w i t h t he opt i on of deval uat i on in
extrem is:  j oi ni ng t he CFA  i s not   t antam ount   t o Eur o-i zati on.   The  credibi l i t y  of  t he  peg  com es f r om   t he 
f act that  such a devaluat i on i s never a uni l ateral opt i on,  and can onl y be achi eved by the unani m ous 
agreem ent  of  t he  part ner  count r i es.
On e   di sadvant age of  CFA  me mb e r ship,   how ever,   i s t hat   a me mb e r   state i s c o mmi t t i ng  i t self   t o 
a com m on  m onet ary  and  exchange r ate pol i cy wi t h  a group  of  count r i es t hat   ma y   di f f er  subst anti all y  i n 
t hei r  econom i c characteri sti cs. Me mb e r  states m ust resign t hem sel ves t o pol i cies that  are based on 
som e aggregate m acroeconom i c target  r ather t han a count r y-specif i c one.  Thi s aspect of t he
assessm ent  of  t he costs and benefi t s of  CFA  me mb e r ship has r eceived r elati vel y l i t t l e att enti on i n t he 
l i t erature,  a defi cit   t hat   t hi s paper  seeks t o  r em edy.  I n  t he  next   secti on  we   r eview  t he  existi ng  l i t erature 
on t he cost s and benefi t s of CF A me mb e r ship,  and di scuss the w ay i n w hi c h  we  wi l l  augm ent  thi s 
l i t erature.
2. The  Fr anc   Zone  and  Op t i ma l   C urrency Ar e a  Theor i es
1 The f i xed exchange rate is a budget ary agreem ent bet w een France and it s forme r  coloni es, so France’s 
me mb e r ship  of  t he  EM U  has  not   prejudi ced  t he  system   ( Ha d j i mi chael  and  Ga l y,   1997).3
The  t wo   CFA  monet ary uni ons are t he We s t   Af r i can Econom i c and M onet ary Un i on ( UEMOA)   and 
t he region of the Cent r al Bank of Equat ori al Af r i ca (BEAC) .  The count r i es that  wi l l  appear in t hi s 
paper  are Be ni n  ( denot ed i n  t he  t ables bel ow   as ben) ,   Bur ki na  Faso  ( bf a) ,   Cot e d’Ivoi r e ( civ),   Senegal  
( sen),   Togo ( t go) ,   Ma l i   ( ml i )   and Ni ger  ( ner)–  all   UEMOA  me mb e r s -   pl us  Ca me r oon  ( cm r),   Congo 
Republ i c ( cgo) ,  G abon ( gab) ,  Ce nt r afr i que ( car) and Chad ( t cd) – all   BEAC  me mb e r s.  Ther e are 
t wo   r ecent  addi t i ons  t o  t he  CFA  mi ssing  f r om   our  paper  because of  i nadequat e dat a:  Equat ori al  Gu i nea 
and Gu i nea-Bi ssau.  Wi t h t he excepti on of  t hese t wo   count r i es,  t he me mb e r s of  t he CFA  we r e all   part  
of t he French Em pir e in A fr i ca, and t he di vi sion bet w een th e  UEMOA a n d  t he BEA C region
corr esponds  t o an i mp e r i al  adm ini str ati ve  di vi sion.
Ther e are a num ber  of  necessary condi t i ons f or  t hi s i nst i t ut i onal   f r am ew ork t o be opt i ma l   f or 
all   me mb e r - states:
( i )T h e  i nst i t ut i ons m ust  guarantee m onetary and fi scal di scipl i ne on t he part  of all  me mb e r s, 
ensuri ng t hat  t he peg i s credibl e in t he l ong run,  and t hat  the CFA  Franc does not  becom e 
overval ued.
( i i )T h e   j oi nt   mo n e t ary pol i cy and co-ordi nat ed f i scal  pol i cy mu s t   be conduct ed wi t h r egard t o t he 
t r ade-off   bet w een pri ce stabil i zati on  and  out put   stabil i zati on.
( i i i )T h e   degree of econom i c heterogenei t y of th e  me mb e r - states shoul d not   be so l arge t hat   t he 
c o mmi t me n t  to com m on m acroeconom i c pol i cies causes dam age that  out we i ghs t he benefi t s 
gai ned  t hrough  ( i ) .
The  existi ng l i t erature on t he CFA  f ocuses l argel y on ( i - i i ) .   A  num ber of  authors have suggest ed t hat  
t he pool i ng of  CFA  count r i es’  f oreign assets and l i abil i t i es,  com bined wi t h w eak r ul es l i mi t i ng t he size 
of  i ndi vi dual   governm ent s’  budget   defi cit s,  has l ed t o poor  m onet ary di scipl i ne on t he part   of  som e of 
t he CFA  count r i es ( De v a r ajan and  Wa l t on,   1994;   Tor nel l   and  Ve l asco,  1995;   St asavage,  1997).   These 
count r i es’ m onet ary profl i gacy has been m et part l y (at least in t he short  term)  by fi nanci ng fr om  
Fr ance, part l y by i mp l i cit  tr ansfers fr om  t hei r  part ner states (Fi eldi ng,  1996),   and part l y by t he 1994 
deval uat i on.  ( The l ast of t hese i mp a i r s the rol e of t he exchange rate peg i n sol vi ng t he t i me -
i nconsi stency probl em .)   The  i mp l i cati on  t hat   t he  CFA  as curr entl y  const i t ut ed i ncl udes  m any  net   l osers 
i s reinforced by the argum ent s of  M’ Be t  and N i am key (1994).  In addi t i on,  De v a r ajan and Rodri k 
( 1991) argue t hat  the CFA  i n t he 1980s w as a l ong w ay fr om  opt i ma l i t y i n t erms  o f  the t r ade-off
bet w een pri ce stabil i zati on and out put  stabil i zati on.  These result s do not  necessari l y m ean that  Franc
Zone me mb e r ship i n t he 21
st  century wi l l   r educe social  we l f are,  but   t hey do i ndi cate subst anti al  scope 
f or imp r ovem ent  in t he i nst i t ut i onal  fr am ew ork of the m onet ary uni on.  Inst i t ut i onal  reform wi l l  be 
necessary  i f   all   count r i es are t o  benefi t   f r om   t hei r   me mb e r ship  of  t he  CFA.
Wh i l e i ssues ( i - i i )   above have been di scussed at  l engt h wi t h r espect  t o t he CFA,   i ssue ( i i i )   has 
r eceived m uch l ess att enti on.  On e  ma j or di sadvant age of Fr anc Zone m em bership i s that  there can 4
onl y be a singl e m onet ary pol i cy i n each m onet ary  uni on.   Suppose  t hat   t wo   CFA  me mb e r s experi ence 
het erogeneous shocks ( by “shocks” we   m ean t hose i nnovat i ons i n m acroeconom i c vari ables t hat   are 
not   i nduced by changes i n pol i cy).   The  onl y count r y-specif i c r esponse  avail able t o  t hei r   governm ent s i s 
t hrough f i scal  pol i cy;  but   i n f r ancophone Af r i ca f i scal  i nst r um ent s are oft en t oo unw i eldy f or  t hem  t o 
be used as stabil i zati on t ool s ( Cha mba s ,   1994).   So  CFA  me mb e r s c o mmi t   t hem sel ves t o a stabil i zati on 
pol i cy that  is determi ned by som e cross-count r ya g g r egate we l f are f unct i on,   a pol i cy t hat   ma y   di f f er 
sharpl y fr om  t he opt i ma l  pol i cy for any one i ndi vi dual  count r y.
2 In t hi s paper we  wi l l  invest i gat e to 
wh a t  extent Fr anc Zone m em bers dif f er in t he shocks t hey face. Es t abli shing t he m agni t ude of the 
di f f erences wi l l   not   i n i t self   det ermi ne wh e t her  an i ndi vi dual   count r y shoul d be i n t he CFA,   wh i ch wi l l  
also depend on t he i ssues in (i - i i )  di scussed above.  But  it  is an essenti al part  of a com prehensive 
answ er  t o  t hi s quest i on.
3
Ther e are a num ber  of  wa y s   of  addressing  t hi s i ssue.  On e   coul d  t r y  t o  det ermi ne  t he  degree of 
simi l ari t y bet w een dif f erent CFA  econom i es in t erms  o f  t he ext ent of wa g e - pri ce fl exibi l i t y and 
econom i c di versif i cati on,   along t he l i nes of  K enen ( 1969).   Count r i es t hat   are simi l ar  i n t hi s r egard  can 
be expect ed to experi ence simi l ar shocks,  and t o respond t o t hem  si mi l ar wa y s .  Thi s approach has 
been im port ant i n assessing t he cost s of EMU me mb e r ship,  but  i t  dem ands a great deal of
mi croeconom i c dat a on i ndi vi dual   goods and f actor  ma r ket s.  Wh i l e t hese  dat a are avail able ( and  have 
been used)  i n som e CFA  me mb e r s – f or  exam ple Cot e d’I voi r e and Senegal  – t hey  are l acking  i n  t he 
l east devel oped Franc Zone count r i es. Si mi l arl y,  one coul d assess the degree of openness i n t r ade 
bet w een t he me mb e r   stat es,  along t he l i nes of  Mc Ki nnon ( 1963).   Ho we v e r ,   mu c h   of  t he cross-border
t r ade bet w een t he  count r i es goes  unreport ed.
4
A  l ess dat a-dem andi ng wa y   of  addressing t he i ssue i s t o use aggregate m acroeconom i c pri ce 
and  out put   dat a ( wh i ch are avail able f or  mo s t   CFA  count r i es)  t o  const r uct   a m acro-econom et r i c mo d e l  
of  t he m onet ary uni on.   The  m odel   wi l l   provi de i nforma t i on about   t he aggregate shocks experi enced by 
each count r y and t he wa y   i n wh i ch t he m acro-econom y  of  each count r y  r esponds  t o  t he  shocks.   Thi s 
i s the approach that  we  f ol l ow .  The f ocus of our att enti on w i l l  be on t he cross-count r y corr elati on 
bet w een shocks t o m acroeconom i c vari ables, and t he degree of simi l ari t y i n t he eff ect these shocks 
eventual l y  have  on  t he  econom y.
Ther e are tw o obj ecti ves t o t hi s piece of analysi s. Fi r st,  w e can determi ne w het her any re-
2  The  f orm  of  t he social  we l f are f unct i on wi l l   depend on t he vot i ng or  l obbyi ng pow er  of  each count r y i n t he 
Ad mi nst r ati ve  Counci l   of  each centr al  bank.   I n  t he  UEMOA  centr al  bank  each  me mb e r   state  pl us  Fr ance  has  t wo  
vot es,  r egardl ess of  t hei r   r elati ve  size.  I n  t he  BEAC  Ca me r oon  has  f our  vot es,  Fr ance t hree,  G abon  t wo   and  t he 
ot her  me mb e r   states one.     In bot h  uni ons  t he  we i ght s gi ven  t o  t he  i nt erests of  each A frican count ry are unl i kel y
t o  be  uni f orm,   but   nei t her  are  t he  we i ght s gi ven  t o  t he  i nt erests of  t he  sm all er  count r i es  l i kel y  t o  be  zero.
3  A not her  essenti al  part   of  t he answ er  i s t o const r uct   a social  we l f are f unct i on i n wh i ch t he actual   or  pot enti al 
benefi t s of  m onet ary  stabil i t y  can be  com pared wi t h  t he  costs of  shared m acroeconom i c pol i cy,  a proj ect  t hat   i s 
beyond  t he  scope  of  t hi s paper.
4  See  Y eats ( 1990)  f or  a  di scussion  of  t he  generi c  probl em s  wi t h  Af r i can  t r ade  stati sti cs.5
draw ing of the boundari es w it hi n t he Franc Zone coul d l ead to a Pareto i mp r ovem ent .  A  necessary 
condi t i on f or  t he curr ent  str uct ure of  t he CFA  t o be opt i ma l   i s t hat   t he degree of  simi l ari t y wi t hi n  each 
m onet ary uni on i s at least as great as the degree of simi l ari t y bet w een any one count r y and t he 
count r i es of t he ot her m onet ary uni on.  Ot herwi se, i t  w oul d reduce the cost s of m onet ary uni on
me mb e r ship t o r edraw  t he boundari es bet w een t he t wo   uni ons.   The  t wo   existi ng groups of  count r i es, 
bound t oget her l argel y by hi stori cal accident ,  em body a w i de vari ety of econom i c str uct ures, as 
i l l ust r ated in Tabl e 1. The BEAC r egion i ncl udes t hree petr ol eum  export ers (Ca me r oon,  Congo
Republ i c and G abon) alongsi de t hree very poor count r i es export i ng cash crops (Ce nt r afr i que,  Cha d 
and Equat ori al Gu i nea).  Th e  UEMOA i ncl udes t wo  r elati vel y l arge econom i es (Cot e d’I voi r e and 
Senegal )  alongsi de si x m uch sm all er ones.  Wi t hi n t hi s region t here is som e cross-border labour 
m obi l i t y,  not ably m i grati on bet w een M ali  and Cot e d’I voi r e, and t o a l esser extent bet w een B urki na 
Faso /  Togo and Cot e d’I voi r e. But  Senegal  and G ui nea-Bi ssau are separated fr om  t hei r  part ner 
count r i es by t he desert  of we s t ern M al i ,  across w hich there is relati vel y l i t t l e m ovem ent   of  l abour.
5
De v a r ajan and B occara (1993) show  t hat  factor m obi l i t y generall y i s low  w i t hi n t he Franc Zone. It  
w oul d  be  a very  happy  accident   i f   t he  curr ent  part i t i oni ng  of  t he  Fr anc Zone  t urned  out   t o  be  opt i ma l .
Second,   we   can determi ne  wh e t her  t here i s any  “out l i er” count r y  experi encing  shocks  t hat   are 
very  di f f erent  t o  t hose  of  i t s part ners.  Thi s paper  i s concerned  wi t h  onl y  one  aspect  of  t he  cost- benefi t
analysi s of m onet ary uni o n  me mb e r ship,  a n d  we  wi l l  not  be abl e to st ate categori call y wh e t her  i t   i s 
wo r t hw hi l e f or  any  i ndi vi dual   count r y  t o  be  part   of  t he  CFA.   Ne v e r t hel ess,  f or  a count r y  w hose  shocks 
are very di f f erent  t o t hose of  i t s part ners,  t he benefi t s of  CFA  me mb e r ship wi t h r espect  t o ( i )   above 
w oul d  have  t o  be  very  l arge  i ndeed t o  off set  t he  cost  of  adheri ng  t o  a com m on  m onet ary  pol i cy.
The t heoreti cal m odel  and econom et r i c fr am ew ork t hat  wi l l  be used t o i dent i f y
m acroeconom i c shocks i n t he count r i es of t he CFA  are descri bed i n t he next  secti on.  Secti on 4
presents and  i nt erprets t he  econom et r i c r esult s,  and  Secti on  5  concl udes.
3.     Identi f ying  M acroeconom ic Shocks
The  aim  of  t hi s paper  i s t o i dent i f y and com pare m acroeconom i c shocks t o di f f erent  me mb e r s of  t he 
CFA.   We   wi l l   f ocus on shocks t o aggregate out put   grow t h and t o  aggregate consum er  pri ce i nfl ati on.  
We   wi l l   assum e not hi ng about   t he r elati ve we i ght s ascri bed t o hi t t i ng t arget s f or  t he t wo   vari ables:  any 
pol i cy conclusi ons draw n fr om  t he com pari son of out put  and i nfl ati on shocks are condi t i onal  on t he 
we i ght s i n  t he  pol i cym aker’ s social  we l f are f unct i on.
                        We   wi l l   also be  agnost i c about   t he  speed wi t h  wh i ch a m onet ary  pol i cy r esponse t o  a shock  i s 
f easibl e.  I f   an i mme d i ate r esponse  i s possibl e t hen  t he  pri me   concern  wi l l   be  t he  degree of  simi l ari t y
5  A ppl eyard  ( 1999)  det ail s mi grati on  pat t erns  i n  t he  area.5
Table 1: Summary Statistics (All figures are percentages)
 ben  bfa   civ  sen  tgo   mli  ner  cmr   cgo  gab  car  tcd
Agriculture share of GDP 1977* 31.9 34.3  24.3 27.1 35.4  61.3 51.8  33.6  15.4  5.5 40.2 35.2 42.0
Agriculture share of GDP 1987* 33.3 31.5  29.2 21.7 33.5  45.2 36.3  24.8  11.9 11.0 46.9 33.1 31.5
Agriculture share of GDP 1997* 38.4 31.8  27.3 18.5 42.2  44.0 38.0  42.1   9.5  7.5 54.1 37.4 27.5
Total debt share of GDP 1977* 22.3 16.4  41.1 31.7 47.6  44.9 13.2  31.4  75.6 52.6 26.0 15.8
Total debt share of GDP 1987* 76.4 38.4 134.6 87.6 98.9  94.2 75.1  33.2 145.2 79.8 47.8 27.9
Total debt share of GDP 1997* 75.9 54.5 152.3 81.0 89.2 119.9 88.7 101.9 227.0 67.5 92.3 54.9
Export share of GDP 1977* 23.5  9.0  42.6 42.0 41.5  12.8 19.6  25.1  45.6 51.6 25.2 15.4
Export share of GDP 1987* 29.3 10.6  33.4 24.1 41.4  16.6 21.5  15.7  41.7 42.7 16.2 15.4
Export share of GDP 1997* 24.9 11.2  46.6 32.8 34.7  25.5 16.2  26.8  77.0 64.0 19.5 18.7
Investment share of GDP 1977* 17.8 22.1  27.3 14.5 34.3  15.6 19.7  28.5  26.6 58.1 11.6 18.5
Investment share of GDP 1987* 12.9 20.9  12.3 12.5 17.6  20.7 12.0  24.7  19.7 26.4 12.5  9.1
Investment share of GDP 1997* 18.5 27.0  16.0 18.7 14.9  20.6 10.8  16.2  26.0 26.3  9.0 16.3
Trade taxes % of tax revenue 1980
§
67.0 53.0  49.0 41.0 40.0  22.0 43.0  44.0  18.0 ---- 47.0 ----
Trade taxes % of expenditure 1980
§
43.0 40.0  31.0 32.0 28.0  16.0 28.0  32.0   9.0 ---- 30.0 ----
Sample mean Dy
¶
 2.7  3.0   3.6  2.6  4.2   2.5  1.9   3.6   4.9  6.6  1.2  0.4
Sample mean Dp
¶
 6.1  5.4   7.2  6.3  6.2   7.0  6.0   7.8   7.4  6.6  6.4  5.8
Sample mean Dm
¶
 9.1 11.3   9.6  6.0  9.7   9.9  9.0   6.6  11.3  9.7 11.9  8.9
Sample s.d. Dy
¶
 4.5  4.0   6.3  3.8  7.4   5.3  9.0   5.7   6.9  9.0  4.2 11.4
Sample s.d. Dp
¶
 8.0  8.1   6.8  7.9  8.0  10.0  9.1   7.2   7.8  9.0  6.5  8.0
Sample s.d. Dm
¶
30.0  9.9  10.5 16.0 34.3  11.1 13.6  13.1  13.7 16.8 13.7 16.8
* Data taken from World Bank Development Indicators 1999; § Data taken from Guillaumont and Guillaumont (1988)
¶ Statistics for the three variables appearing in the econometric model in section 3: Dy = GDP growth rate; Dp = 
inflation; Dm = money supply growth rate6
i n t he shocks hi t t i ng t he econom y (and t herefore the degree of simi l ari t y i n t he m onet ary pol i cy
r esponse mo s t   appropri ate f or  each count r y),   r egardl ess of  t he degree of  simi l ari t y i n t hei r   consequent  
l ong r un eff ects.  Wh e n   t he pol i cym aker  can neut r ali ze any shocks wi t h a t i me l y pol i cy r esponse t hei r  
pot enti al  l ong r un eff ects are not   a pri me   concern.   But   i f   an i mme d i ate r esponse i s not   possibl e t hen 
t he  l ong  r un  eff ects are as i m port ant  as t he  nat ure of  t he  i ni t i al  shocks,   so we   wi l l   l ook  at  bot h.
M any exi sti ng papers on t he i dent i f i cati on and cross-count r y com pari son of  m acroeconom i c 
shocks fol l ow  t he m et hod of Bl anchard and Q uah (1989).  Exampl es are Bayoum i  and Ei chengreen 
( 1996) and Funke (1995).  Thi s invol ves est i ma t i ng a reduced form VAR f or i nfl ati on and out put  
grow t h,and  i dent i f yi ng  str uct ural  shocks  t o  each vari able by  i m posi ng  a set  of  r estr i cti ons  t hat   i ncl udes 
t he t heory-based assum pti on t hat   i n t he l ong r un out put   shocks can aff ect  i nfl ati on but   not   vice versa.
We  w i l l  adopt  t he general m odel l i ng st r ategy of Bl anchard and Q uah i n t hi s paper,  but  wi t hi n t he 
f r am ew ork of a dif f erent theoreti cal m odel .  W e do not  assum e that  out put  grow t h i s independent  of 
i nfl ati on i n t he l ong r un,   because t here i s evidence f r om  em pir i cal  wo r k on grow t h and i nvest me n t   i n 
LDCs   t hat   hi gh  i nfl ati on can have del eteri ous consequences f or  l ong r un grow t h ( Fi scher,   1993).
6  Thi s 
coul d be ei t her because high i nfl ati on i s associated w it h a hi gher degree of pri ce uncert aint y,
depressing i nvest me n t  (as in,  for exam ple, Gr een and V il l anueva,  1990),   or  because l arger  and mo r e 
f r equent   pri ce changes i ncrease search costs.  Mo r eover,   t he mo t i vat i on f or  t he paper  com es f r om  t he 
i dent i f i cati on of  t hose count r y-specif i c shocks t hat   are not   t he r esult   of  i nnovat i ons i n m onet ary pol i cy. 
So  we   need t o i dent i fy shocks t o out put   grow t h and i nfl ati on condi t i onal   on m oney suppl y grow t h i n 
t he CFA .  Mo r eover,  it  is appropri ate in a m odel  of these sm all  open econom i es to al l ow  for foreign 
pri ce shocks.   So  our  VAR  wi l l   i ncl ude  f our  vari ables,  not   t wo .  
So our aim i s to const r uct  a str uct ural,  four-vari able  VAR r epresentati on of the m acro-
econom y of each m em ber of the CFA  for wh i ch data is avail able. The esti ma t ed innovat i ons i n t hi s 
VAR  wi l l   be i nt erpreted as m acroeconom i c shocks.   I nference about   t he degree of  simi l ari t y  bet w een 
t he  shocks  t o  t wo   count r i es wi l l   be  based  on  t he  m agni t ude  of  t he  corr elati on  of  t he  i nnovat i ons  i n  t hei r  
r especti ve VARs ,   and on t he degree of  simi l ari t y i n t he i m pact  of  t hese i nnovat i ons on t he r est  of  t he 
econom y.   We   wi l l   f ocus part i cularl y on shocks t o dom est i c pri ces and out put ,   condi t i onal   on dom est i c 
m onet ary pol i cy and com m on f oreign pri ce shocks.   So  t he VAR  needs t o i ncl ude dom est i c m oney and 
f oreign  pri ces alongsi de  dom est i c pri ces and  out put .   The  str uct ural  m odel   wi l l   be  esti ma t ed by i m posi ng
exactl y i dent i f yi ng r estr i cti ons on a r educed f orm  VAR.   These r estr i cti ons wi l l   be i m posed on t he l ong 
r un equi l i bri um  i n t he m odel ,   i n t he styl e of  Bl anchard and Qu a h   ( 1989),   not   on short   r un coeff i cients. 
Ho we v e r ,  t he m acroeconom i c m odel  we  e mp l oy i s larger t han t he one used i n t he t r adit i onal
Bl anchard-Qu a h   f r am ew ork,   and  t he  r estr i cti ons  em bodi ed i n  i t   have  a di f f erent  t heoreti cal  mo t i vat i on.
6  Br uno  and  Eas t erl y  ( 1998)  cont est  t he  l i nk  bet w een i nfl ati on  and  l ong  r un  grow t h.   But   i n  t he  f ace of  confl i cti ng 
evidence,   we   choose  not   t o  i m pose  t he  a  pri ori   r estr i cti on  t hat   i nfl ati on  has  no  i m pact  on  l ong  r un  grow t h.7
We   wi l l   not   l ook  di r ectl y  at  t he  corr elati on  bet w een shocks  t o  t he  Fr ench econom y  and  shocks 
t o t he CFA.   Fr ance i s not   i t self   part   of  t he  CFA,   alt hough  i t   does  underwr i t e t he  exchange r ate peg  by 
guaranteeing t o exchange Euros for CFA Fr ancs at the fi xed rate, and by provi di ng aut om at i c short  
t erm  Ba l ance of  Paym ent s defi cit   f i nanci ng t hrough t he Op e r ati ons A ccount   ( Vi zy,  1989).   I f   t here i s 
an a s y mme t r y bet w een t he m acroeconom i c shocks f acing Fr ance ( or  Eur ol and)  and t hose f acing t he 
CFA,   t hi s i s not   necessari l y a cause f or  concern ( at  l east,   f r om  t he Af r i can poi nt   of  vi ew ).   The  t wo  
C FA  centr al banks can and do pursue stabil i zati on pol i cy t hat   i s di f f erent  f r om  t hat   of  t he Eur opean 
Ce nt r al Bank.  CFA i nt erest rates and rates of grow t h of base m oney can be set  independent l y of 
t hose i n Europe,  and t here is no need for them  t o use m onet ary pol i cy to t arget  the CFA F-Eur o
exchange r ate:  Fr ance t akes care of  t he peg.
7  Ne v e r t hel ess,  i nfl ati on  i n  t he  CFA  i s str ongl y  corr elated 
wi t h Fr ench i nfl ati on ( Lowr ey,  1995),   and our  econom et r i c m odel   wi l l   all ow  f or  t hi s t hough t he f oreign 
pri ce vari able.
We   begi n wi t h a descri pt i on of  t he t heory,   and t hen r elate t hi s t o t he econom et r i c m odel   t o be 
esti ma t ed i n  t he  f ol l ow i ng  secti on.
3. 1  The  t heoret i cal  f ram ew ork
The  t heoreti cal  m odel   f r om  wh i ch t he r estr i cti ons are deri ved i s a descri pt i on of  t he m acroeconom i c 
steady st ate. The dependent  vari ables in t he m odel  are Dr (r eal int erest rate grow t h) Dm  ( nom i nal  
m oney  stock  grow t h)  Dy  ( i ncom e  grow t h)  and Dp  ( i nfl ati on  i n  dom est i c consum er  pri ces).   Ther e i s one 
i ndependent   vari able, Dpf r ( f oreign i nfl ati on m easured i n dom est i c curr ency uni t s).   I n  t he  steady  state, 
t he  dependent   vari ables i n  each econom y  are det ermi ned  as f ol l ow s:
8
D[m -  p]  =  a0  +  a1￿Dy,    +  a2￿Dr,  a1‡  0  ‡  a2 M oney De ma n d
( 1)
Dp  =  b0  +  b1￿Dpf r,  b1‡  0R e l at i ve PPP
( 2)
Dy =  c 0  +  c 1￿Dp  +  c 2￿Dr,  c 1£  0,   c2£  0 Aggregat e Suppl y( 3)
Dr =  f 0  +  f 1￿Dy +  f 2￿D[pfr-   p],   f 1£  0  £  f 2 Aggregat e De ma n d
( 4)
Equat i on (1) states that  long run real m oney dem and grow t h (wi t h a reasonabl y w i de defi ni t i on of 
m oney) is a funct i on of real incom e grow t h and real int erest rate changes. In t he st eady st ate, the 
nom i nal  m oney st ock i s assum ed to adj ust  to cl ear the m oney m arket  for a given l evel of nom i nal  
7  The  burden  on  France  i s not   t hat   onerous.   The  t ot al  m oney  suppl y  of  t he  CFA  i s about   2%   t hat   of  Fr ance  ( Vi zy, 
1989).
8  Ther e  i s no  uncovered  i nt erest  pari t y  condi t i on  i n  t he  m odel .   I . e.,   capit al  does  not   f l ow   f r eely  across t he  borders 
of  t he Fr anc Zone.   See Vi zy ( 1989)  f or  a di scussion  of  t he  i nst i t ut i onal   r estr i cti ons  on  capit al  mo v e me n t   bet we e n  
Fr ance  and  t he  CFA  ( i ncl udi ng  mu l t i pl e  t axes  on  such t r ansfers),   and  Fi eldi ng  ( 1993)  f or  evidence  on  t he  absence 8
m oney dem and,   and t he m onet ary authori t i es do not   r estr i ct  t he f orma t i on of  bank deposi t s.  Ther e i s 
som e evidence f or  t hi s assum pti on  i n  Lowr ey ( 1995).
Equat i on ( 2)  em bodi es a w eak version of  t he assum pti on of  r elati ve PPP.   We   do not   assum e 
t hat  dom est i c and foreign consum er pri ce infl ati on rates converge i n t he l ong run (alt hough t hi s is 
possibl e,  i f  b0 = [ 1 -  b 1] =  0).   Ra t her,   we   assum e t hat   i f   t here i s any di vergence,   i t   i s at  l east  at  a 
const ant rate. Lowr ey (1995) provi des evi dence for thi s w eak form o f  relati ve PPP am ongst  CFA 
me mb e r s,  wh e r eas N uven ( 1994)  i s able t o r eject  t he hypot hesi s of  str ong PPP  f or  mo s t   Fr anc Zone 
count r i es.
Equat i on (3) all ow s t he grow t h of aggregate suppl y t o depend on t he grow t h of aggregate 
dom est i c pri ces,  even i n t he l ong r un.   The  i nt r oduct i on of  t he t erm  c 1￿Dp  i s not   i nt ended  t o  suggest   t hat  
t here i s l ong r un m oney i l l usi on,   or that   nom i nal   wa g e s   are perm anent l y r i gi d.   Ra t her,   i t   all ow s f or  t he 
possibi l i t y t hat  hi gh i nfl ati on can have del eteri ous consequences for long run grow t h,  as discussed in 
secti on 1. 2.   The  coeff i cient  c2  all ow s  i nt erest  r ate i ncreases t o  depress capit al  stock  grow t h  and  hence 
i ncom e  grow t h  i n  t he  l ong  r un.
Equat i on  ( 4)  i s an i nvert ed aggregate dem and  curve,   i n  wh i ch t he  grow t h  of  aggregate dem and 
depends on t he grow t h of  t he i nt erest  r ate ( wh i ch wi l l   aff ect  dom est i c dem and f or  consum pt i on and 
i nvest me n t   goods)  and  r eal  exchange r ate appreciati on  ( wh i ch wi l l   aff ect  net   export   grow t h).
The  one  dependent   vari able wh i ch i s di f f i cult   t o  m easure i n  t he  CFA  i s t he  i nt erest  r ate,  r.  The 
onl y r ate r eport ed consi stentl y t hroughout   t he sam ple peri od i s t he off i cial  centr al  bank di scount   r ate, 
wh i ch i s unl i kel y t o equal   t he ma r gi nal   cost  of  l oanabl e f unds.   So  we   do not   att em pt  t o m odel   Dr,  and 
i nst ead express equat i ons  ( 3-4)  i n  r educed f orm:
Dy =  [c0  +  c 2￿f 0  +  ( c 1-   c 2￿f 1) ￿Dp  +  c 2￿f 2￿Dpf r]/[1 -  c2￿f 1]
( 5)
Si nce c2￿f 1 ‡ 0,   t he denom i nat or  of  t hi s expression,   and t herefore t he i m pact  of  i ncreases i n Dp  and 
Dpf r on Dy,   are am biguous.   For   t he  sam e r eason t he  t erm  [c1-   c 2￿f 1] i s am biguousl y  signed,   but   c 2￿f 2£
0;   so t he  eff ects on Dp  and Dpf r on Dy coul d  wo r k  i n  t he  sam e or  i n  opposi t e di r ecti ons.   The  “norma l ” 
case is w hen an increase in i nfl ati on decreases output  grow t h,  because of it s eff i ciency-r educi ng
eff ects.  Ho we v e r ,   t here i s also a “perverse” case wh e n   bot h t he elasti cit y of  aggregate suppl y wi t h 
r espect to t he i nt erest rate and the sl ope of the IS cur ve are greater than uni t y ( c 2￿f 1 > 1 ) ,   so t he 
r esponse  of  l ong  r un  grow t h  t o  i nfl ati on  f l i ps  sign.
Si nce equati on (5) i s const r uct ed by subst i t ut i ng t he aggregate dem and curve i nt o t he
aggregate suppl y curve,  t he shocks t o out put  in our m odel  are not  to be i nt erpreted as “aggregate 
dem and” or “aggregate suppl y” shocks.  They are m ore readil y i nt erpreted as aggregate “real” (as 
of  i nt erest  pari t y  bet w een  t he  CFA  and  Fr ance.9
opposed  t o  pri ce or  nom i nal   m oney)  shocks.  
Ou r   equat i on  f or  m oney  dem and  grow t h  i s also expressed  i n  r educed f orm:
Dm  =  a0  +  a2￿f 0  +  [a1  +  a2￿f 1] ￿Dy   +  a2￿f 2￿Dpf r +  [1 -   a2￿f 2] ￿Dp( 6)
I mp l i cit   i n equat i ons ( 5-6)  i s t he equi l i bri um  adjust me n t   of  t he r eal  ma r gi nal   cost  of  l oanabl e f unds.   At  
t i me s   t he t wo   centr al  banks of  t he CFA  area have contr ol l ed nom i nal   l endi ng  r ates on  cert ain  t ypes  of 
l oan,   so i t   w oul d  be  very  heroi c t o  assum e t he  equi l i bri um   adjust me n t   of  t he  f orma l   f i nanci al  sector  l oan 
r ate. We  a r e rather relyi ng on t he assum pti on t hat  if  the forma l  sector loans m arket  does not  clear,
t here i s at  t he  ma r gi n  a f l exibl e curb  ma r ket   i nt erest  r ate t hat   adjust s endogenousl y.
The  steady state f or  each econom y i s descri bed by t he val ues of  t he param eters i n equat i ons 
( 2)  and  ( 5-6)  pl us  a statem ent  of  t he  l ong  r un  l evel  of  Dpf r:
Dpf r =  Dpf r 0 ( 7)
Wi t h  a f i xed  /   m anaged  nom i nal   exchange r ate Dpf r i s i ndependent   of  t he  ot her  vari ables i n  t he  m odel .
I f  we  e s t i ma t e the dynam i cs of t he four vari ables (Dpf r, Dp, Dy, Dm)  wi t hi n  a  VAR 
f r am ew ork for wh i ch equati ons (2) and (5-7) descri be t he st eady-state, then t here are six l ong run 
r estr i cti ons t o be i m posed.   These are t he absence of  Dm  i n  equat i on  ( 5);   t he  absence of  Dy  and Dm  i n 
equat i on ( 2);   and t he absence of  Dp,Dy and Dm  i n  equat i on  ( 7).
9  These six  r estr i cti ons  wi l l   be  used  t o 
i dent i fy t he  system .  No t e t hat   i n  t hi s m odel   of  a f i xed  exchange r ate econom y  wi t h  r elati ve  PPP  i n  t he 
l ong r un,   and wi t h a l ong r un aggregate suppl y f unct i on t hat   i ncl udes i nfl ati on,   shocks t o i nfl ati on wi l l  
have a l ong r un i m pact  on out put ,   but   shocks t o out put   wi l l   have  no  i m pact  on  i nfl ati on.   I n  t hi s wa y   we  
di f f er fr om  ot her papers that  use l ong run restr i cti ons t o i dent i f y a m acroeconom i c m odel ,  in w hi ch 
out put  shocks t ypi call y have a l ong run i m pact on i nfl ati on,  but  infl ati on shocks have no i m pact on 
out put .
W e do not  im pose corr espondi ng short  run restr i cti ons on equat i ons (2) and (5).  We  a l l ow  
changes i n Dm t o i nfl uence Dy i n t he short   r un,   because a di sequi l i bri um  i n t he mo n e y   ma r ket   mi ght  
we l l  aff ect aggregate dem and,  as consum ers respond t o excess suppl y of  or  dem and f or  m oney by 
i ncreasing or  r educi ng t hei r   spendi ng.   We   also all ow  changes i n Dm  and Dy t o aff ect  Dp  i n t he short  
r un  because short   r un  devi ati ons  f r om   PPP  are possibl e,  and  i n  t he  short   r un  pri ces r ather  t han  nom i nal  
m oney  ma y   adjust   t o  clear  t he  m oney  ma r ket   i n  r esponse  t o  changes i n Dy or  Dm.
Ther e i s no l ong r un r estr i cti on on t he m oney grow t h equat i on,   equat i on ( 6).   We   are assum ing 
t hat   i n t he l ong r un,   t he nom i nal   val ue of  bank deposi t s can adjust   t o sati sfy peopl e’s dem and,   and t hat  
t hi s dem and depends on i nfl ati on,   i ncom e and t he i nt erest  r ate.  I n t he short   r un,   wh e n   PPP does not  
9  Ther e wi l l   also be short  run  restricti ons  on  t he  equat i on  for Dpf r,  since  t hi s vari able  i s str i ctl y  exogenous  t o  t he 
ot her  t hree.10
have t o hol d,   i t   ma y   be t hat   m oney ma r ket   equi l i bri um  i s achieved ( at  l east  part i all y)  by t he adjust me n t  
of  dom est i c pri ces.  I n t hi s case,  a shock t o t he m oney base coul d i m pact  on Dm  i n  t he  short   r un.   Thi s 
does not   m ean t hat   Dm  can be  assum ed t o  be  w eakly  exogenous  t o Dp  and Dy.  Ce nt r al  bank  decisions 
about   narr ow  m oney creati on are l i kel y t o depend on t he curr ent  state of  t he m acro-econom y:   t here i s 
evidence for  t hi s wi t h r espect  t o Cot e d’I voi r e i n Fi eldi ng ( 1999).   Dm  i s l i kel y  t o  depend  on Dp  and Dy
i n  bot h  t he  short   r un  and  t he  l ong  r un,   but   f or  di f f erent  r easons.
I n  t he  absence of  any  short   r un  r estr i cti ons  i n  our  m odel   ( except  t he  str i ct  exogenei t y  of  Dpf r)
t he  dynam i cs of  i nfl ati on,   out put   grow t h  and  m oney  grow t h  can be  descri bed  by  a system  of  t he  f orm:
B11( L)Dpf r t     =  e1t ( 7a)
B21( L)Dpf r t   +  B22( L)Dpt   +  B23( L)Dy t   +  B24( L)Dmt   =  e2t
( 2a)
B31( L)Dpf r t     +  B32( L)Dpt   +  B33( L)Dy t   +  B34( L)Dmt   =  e3t
( 5a)
B41( L)Dpf r t     +  B42( L)Dpt   +  B43( L)Dy t   +  B44( L)Dmt   =  e4t
( 6a)
wh e r e equati on (xa) corr esponds t o equat i on (x) above,  the Bi j ( L)  are lag pol ynom i als em bodyi ng 
r estr i cti ons  t o  ensure t hat   equat i ons  ( 2)  and  ( 5-7)  hol d  i n  t he  l ong  r un,   and  t he  ei t   are ort hogonal   shocks 
t o foreign i nfl ati on,  dom est i c infl ati on,  out put  grow t h and m oney grow t h respect i vel y.  The out put  
grow t h shocks e3t com bine shocks t o aggregate dem and w i t h shocks t o aggregate supply,  separate 
i dent i f i cati on of  t he t wo   com ponent s bei ng i m possibl e i n t he absence of  appropri ate i nt erest  r ate dat a. 
To t he ext ent that  e3t  i s dom i nat ed by product i vi t y shocks,   we   mi ght   expect  econom i es wi t h simi l ar 
product i on str uct ures t o have a r elati vel y hi gh corr elati on i n e3t.   I n  t he  cont ext  of  t he  Fr anc Zone  such 
a group mi ght   be f orme d   by t he pet r ol eum  export ers ( Ca me r oon,   Congo Republ i c and G abon)  versus
t he pet r ol eum  im port ers (t he rest) ;  or by t he sem i - ari d Sahel i an econom i es (Bur ki na Faso,  Senegal ,  
Ma l i ,  Ni ger and Chad) versus the ot her count r i es w it h m ore tr opi cal cli ma t es. But  it  is also possibl e 
t hat   t hat   e3t  i s dom i nat ed by aggregate dem and shocks.   I n t he absence of  any obvi ous di f f erences i n 
t he st r uct ure of pri vat e sector dem and across the CFA ,  the m ost  li kel y reason for di f f erences or 
simi l ari t i es in aggregate dem and shocks am ong Franc Zone m em bers is governm ent  behavi or.  CFA 
governm ent s di f f er  i n t he extent  t o wh i ch t hei r   budget   defi cit   i s subj ect  t o l arge shocks,   because som e 
r ely on a mu c h   narr ow er  t ax base t han ot hers ( Be r gougnoux,   1988;   Cha mba s ,   1994).   A  governm ent  
t hat  is less reli ant on i m port  dut i es or export  taxes to fi nance i t s expendi t ure i s l ess l i kel y t o have a 
hi ghl y vari able defi cit ,   or  at  l east  i t s defi cit   i s l ess l i kel y t o vary wi t h t he i nt ernat i onal   pri ces of  pri ma r y 
com m odi t i es.  I n  Tabl e 1  Congo  Republ i c and  Ma l i   stand  out   f r om   t he  r est  i n  t hi s r egard.   Ho we v e r ,   i f   a 
governm ent   i s prepared t o ma k e   use of  external   borr ow i ng i n order  t o cushion t he dom est i c econom y 11
f r om  shocks t o i t s defi cit ,  such shocks need not  t r anslate int o aggregate dem and shocks.  So
governm ent s wh i ch have r eli ed on a r elati vel y l arge am ount   of  defi cit   f i nanci ng  and  so becom e hi ghl y 
i ndebt ed m ay di f f er fr om  t he rest.  As  i ndi cated in Tabl e 1, Congo Republ i c, Ma l i  and Cot e d’I voi r e 
have  t he  hi ghest   debt   l evels.
3. 2  The  econom et ric f ram ew ork
The i dent i f i cati on of the system  is based on t he m et hodol ogi cal fr am ew ork i nt r oduced by Bl anchard 
and Q uah (1989),  alt hough our m acroeconom i c m odel  di f f ers fr om  t hei r s. For  each count r y w e 
esti ma t e a r educed f orm  VAR:
Xt   =  A( L) Xt - 1  +  e t   =  ( I   –  A( L) )
- 1e t
( 8)
wh e r eA( L)   i s a 4  x  4  ma t r i x  of  l ag pol ynom i als and Xtdenot es t he  4  x  1  vector  of  stati onary  vari ables:
Xt   =  [ Dpf r t ,Dpt ,Dy t ,Dmt ]’ (9)
and w e i m pose t he restr i cti on t hat  A12,A13  and A14  = 0,   i . e.,  Dpf r is str i ctl y exogenous.  Thi s four-
vari able m odel  corr esponds t o t he system  represented by equat i ons  ( 2)  and ( 5-7)  above.   A ppendi x 1 
presents evidence t hat  the vari ables w e are deali ng w i t h are stati onary.  et   r epresents t he vect or  of 
r educed f orm  r esidual s.  We   i m pose no a pri ori   r estr i cti ons on t he r educed f orm  r esidual   covari ance 
ma t r i x.  Mo r eover,  t he et  are li kel y t o be corr elated across count r i es, so all  t he V A R s m ust be 
esti ma t ed simu l t aneously.
I n t he absence of  any t heoreti cal  r estr i cti ons t he r educed f orm  i nnovat i ons e t   have  no  obvi ous 
econom i c i nt erpretati on.   Such  an i nt erpretati on wi l l   depend o n t he deri vat i on of  an alt ernat i ve m ovi ng 
average representati on t o equat i on (8),  wh i ch formu l ates vari able m ovem ent s as a funct i on of past  
structuralshocks,et :
Xt   =  C( L) et ( 10)
wh e r e,  i n t erms   of  t he t heoreti cal  m odel   r epresented by equat i ons ( 2a)  and ( 5a-7a),C  =  B
- 1  and t he 
ma t r i x et  cont ains t he st r uct ural shocks t o each equati on i n t he system . The elem ents of et  are 
mu t ual l y uncorr elated. Thi s w il l  all ow  us t o est i ma t e the cross-count ry corr elati on coeff i cients for 
each elem ent of et .  M ovi ng fr om  equat i on (8) to equat i on (10) requi r es the i dent i f i cati on of a non-
singul ar  ma t r i x S  t hat   l i nks  t he  r educed f orm  and  str uct ural  i nnovat i ons,   i . e.:
et   =  Set ( 11)
wh e r e, i n t erms  o f  equat i on (10),S  = C( 0).  I n an n-vari able m odel  i dent i f i cati on requi r es n
2
r estr i cti ons:  in our case, n
2 = 16.  Fol l ow i ng t he Bl anchard-Qu a h  f r am ew ork,  w e assum e that  the 12
str uct ural  shocks are ort hogonal   and have unit   vari ance,  i . e. Var ( et ) =  I .   Thi s gi ves us ( n+1)n/ 2 =  10 
r estr i cti ons.   The  ot her  six r estr i cti ons com e f r om  t he assum pti on t hat   i n t he m ovi ng average process 
descri bed  i n  equat i on  ( 10),   wh i ch can be  wr i t t en out   i n  f ul l   as:
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
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t he C(L)   ma t r i x i s l ow er- t r i angul ar,   i . e.,  C 12  =  C13  =  C14  =  C23  =  C24  =  C34  =  0.   These are precisely 
t he six r estr i cti ons em bodi ed i n t he l ong r un m acroeconom i c m odel   descri bed above.
10  The  i m posi t i on 
of  t hese r estr i cti ons wi l l   all ow  us t o r ecover  t he str uct ural  shocks etf r om   t he  r educed f orm  shocks  et
i n t he ori gi nal  VAR.
11 In t he next  secti on,  we  p r esent the result s of esti ma t i ng t h e  VARs  f or each 
count r y.
4. Est i ma t i ng  t he  M acroeconom ic Shocks
4. 1  Es t i ma t i on
The r educed form VAR r epresented by equat i on (8) wa s  e s t i ma t ed (i n  GAUSS)  for the 12 CFA  
count r i es f or  wh i ch dat a are avail able.  Da t a on r eal  i ncom e f or  all   t he count r i es are t aken f r om  Penn
Wo r l d Tabl es 5. 6 f or  1962-1991,   m easured as annual   chain- l i nked  r eal  GDP.   Thi s i s suppl em ented by 
com parable fi gures for 1991-1997 fr om  t he W orl d Bank.  Dy i s defi ned as t he annual  change in t he 
l ogari t hm   of  t hi s m easure,  f r om   1963  t o  1997.     Do me s t i c consum er  pri ce dat a f or  t hi s peri od  are t aken 
wh e r e possibl e fr om  t he IMF  I nt ernat i onal  Fi nanci al  St at i sti cs,   l i ne 64 ( consum er  pri ces);   but   f or 
Ce nt r afr i que onl y l i ne 63 ( w hol esale pri ces)  i s r eport ed.  For   Be ni n,   no pri ce i ndex at  all   i s r eport ed,  so 
we   use t he GDP  defl ator  as a proxy.   Dp  i s defi ned as t he annual   change i n t he l ogari t hm  of  t he pri ce 
i ndex.  The nom inal  m oney seri es used i sl i ne 34 pl us li ne 35 i n Int ernat i onal  Fi nanci al  St at i sti cs
( i ncl udi ng bot h t i me   and savings deposi t s hel d i n dom est i c banks,   as we l l   as t he i m put ed share of  each 
count r y i n t ot al  curr ency i ssued).   Dm  i s defi ned as t he annual   change i n t he l ogari t hm  of  t hi s m easure. 
The  f oreign pri ce seri es i s m easured as t he Fr ench consum er  pri ce i ndex mu l t i pl i ed by t he CFA  Fr anc 
– Fr ench Franc exchange rate; Dpf r i s defi ned as t he change i n t he l ogari t hm  of  t hi s seri es.  I n t hi s 
wa y  t he evol ut i on of dom est i c incom e,  m oney and pri ces is condi t i oned on t he sam e foreign pri ce 
shock i n all   count r i es.  Ad j ust i ng t he defi ni t i on of  Dpf r t o  i ncl ude  a t r ade-we i ght ed basket   of  curr encies 
10  I n  t he  ori gi nal   Bl anchard  and  Qu a h   ( 1989)  paper,   t he  m acroeconom i c  m odel   i ncl uded  onl y  t wo   vari ables,  so t he 
C( L)  ma t r i x  wa s   2  x  2  and  onl y  one  t heoreti cal  r estr i cti on  wa s   r equi r ed  t o  ma k e   i t   l ow er - t r i angul ar.
11  The  norma l i zati on t o uni t   vari ances,  wh i ch i s necessary t o i dent i f y t he str uct ural  shocks,   does put   a l i mi t   on 
t hei r   i nforma t i onal   cont ent:   t he  cross- count r y  corr elati on  coeff i cients cannot   be  accom panied  by  a  com pari son  of 
i nnovat i on vari ances. Ne v e r t hel ess, as Table 2 bel ow  show s,  the residual  vari ances for each vari able in t he 
unrestr i cted  VAR  are  qui t e  simi l ar  across count r i es  ( except  f or  m oney  grow t h  i n  Togo  and  Be ni n,   wh i ch  i s due  t o 
j ust   one  l arge  spike  i n  t hese  count r i es i n  t he  deval uat i on  year,   1994).   So  t he  vari ances of  t he  str uct ural  shocks 13
di d not   ma k e   a subst anti al  di f f erence t o t he r esult s.  The  f ul l   dat a set  i s avail able on r equest .   A ppendi x 
1 (avail able on request )  di scusses stati onari t y t ests for the vari ables are int erest;  in al l  cases a null  
hypot hesi s of  non-stati onari t y  can be  r ejected.
I f   we   we r e esti ma t i ng a VAR  f or  a singl e count r y t hen an OLS  esti ma t e w oul d be eff i cient,  
since lags of all  the endogenous vari ables appear in al l  of the equat i ons,  and w e w oul d not  need to 
bot her to est i ma t e a residual  covari ance m atr i x.  But  in a m odel  wi t h several count r i es there is a 
pot enti al  eff i ciency gai n f r om  usi ng a SUR  esti ma t or  t o capture cross-count r y  r esidual   corr elati ons.   I t  
i s not  possibl e to est i ma t e a com plete covari ance m atr i x for the residual s fr om  every equat i on usi ng 
annual   dat a f or  1963-97:   alt oget her  i n our  m odel   t here are 39 t i me   seri es f or  dom est i c i ncom e,   m oney 
and pri ce grow t h.   Ne v e r t hel ess,  we   can esti ma t e cross-count r y  covari ance ma t r i ces f or  each vari able 
i n t he m odel  by st acking t he Dp equat i ons for each count r y and est i ma t i ng t hem  by SU R,  and t hen 
doi ng t he sam e f orDy and Dm.   Thi s wi l l   be  asym pt ot i call y  mo r e eff i ci ent  t han  OLS,   but   does  not   all ow  
f or  corr elati on  bet w een,  say,  Dp  i n  one  count r y  and Dyi n  anot her.
Tabl e 2 presents s u mma r y di agnost i c stati sti cs f or  equat i ons esti ma t ed i n t hi s wa y .   I n each of 
t he t hree SUR  esti ma t es ( f or  Dp,Dy and Dm)   t he equat i ons have been esti ma t ed wi t h a l ag order  of 
t wo ;  thi s choi ce is m ade on t he basi s of the A kai ke Informa t i on Cri t eri on.  The r egression R
2s vary 
consi derably,   but   are t ypi call y bet w een one t hi r d and one hal f ,   and are greater  f or  Dp  t han  f or  Dya n d
Dm.  These proport i ons are perhaps a l i t t l e sm all er than t he fi gures one m i ght  expect for a typi cal 
OECD  count r y or  NI C:   t he Fr anc Zone i s ma d e   up of  very sm all   open econom i es wh i ch suff er  f r om  
l arge shocks.   Ther e i s no signi f i cant  autocorr elati on i n any of  t he r educed f orm  r esidual s.  Tabl e 2  also 
r eport s sum m ary st ati sti cs for t he foreign pri ce infl ati on equat i on,  wh i ch is m odel ed as an
autoregressive process.  For   each i ndi vi dual   count r y VAR,   t he set  of  r egressors i s j oi nt l y signi f i cant  at 
t he 1%  l evel,   t hough i ndi vi dual   coeff i cients are som eti me s   i nsi gni f i cant.   Thi s i s also t r ue  of  each stack 
of  vari ables across count r i es.
12
These esti ma t es are used  t o  const r uct   t he  r educed f orm  i nnovat i on  ma t r i x et   f or  each count r y.  
I m posi ng t he restr i cti ons out l i ned i n t he previous sect i on al l ow s us t o const r uct  the corr espondi ng 
norma l i zed str uct ural innovat i on m at r i x et .  W e do not  report  det ail ed esti ma t es of each equati on i n 
each count r y,  but  these are avail able on request .  In each count r y t he asym pt ot i c im pul se responses 
i mp l i cit   i n t he esti ma t ed m odel   ( t hat   i s,  t he esti ma t ed elem ents of  t he l ow er-   t r i angul ar  ma t r i x C(L)   i n 
equat i on ( 12))   are t heory-consi stent  i n  t he  sense t hat   t hey  eit her  have  a val ue  consi stent  wi t h  t he  signs 
of  t he  param eters of  t he  t heoreti cal  m odel   r epresented by  equat i ons  ( 2)  and  ( 5-7),   or  are i nsi gni f i cantl y 
di f f erent  f r om   zero.
I n t he rest of t hi s secti on w e present three features of int erest in t he regression result s: the 
t hat   l i e  behi nd  t he  i nnovat i ons  i n  t he  unrestr i cted  VAR  are  unl i kel y  t o  vary  enorm ousl y  across countr i es.
12  The  correspondi ng  F- stati sti cs  are  not   r eport ed  i n  Tabl e  2,   but   are  avail able  on  r equest .14
cross-count r y corr elati on coeff i cients for the pri ce shocks i n t he st r uct ural m odel ,  the corr espondi ng 
coeff i cients for t he i ncom e shocks,  and t he corr espondi ng i m pul se responses i n t he di f f erent
count r i es.
13
The  f ul l   set  of  cross-count r y  corr elati on  ma t r i ces f or  each elem ent  of  et   i s r eport ed i n  f ul l   i n  A ppendi x 
2 (avail able on request ) ,  along w i t h corr espondi ng t - r ati os and cross-count r y corr elati on coeff i cients 
f or et .  Tabl es 3-6  s u mma r i ze the i nforma t i on i n A ppendi x 2.  The i nnovat i on corr elati on st ati sti cs 
presented i n  t hese  t ables are desi gned  t o  address t he  t wo   quest i ons  posed  above:  
( i )   W oul d i t   ma k e   sense ( i f   pol i cy-ma k e r s’  pri me   concern  i s wi t h  i nfl ati on  and  out put   stabil zati on,   and  i f  
t here i s t ypi call y  a t i me l y  r esponse  t o  shocks)  t o  r edraw  t he  borders wi t hi n  t he  CFA?
( i i )   Ar e t here any  “out l i er” count r i es w hose  CFA  me mb e r ship  mi ght   especiall y  wa n t   t o  quest i on?




















































































For   t he i
t h  me mb e r   of  t he UEMOA,   or  of  t he BEAC  r egion,   one can com put e coeff i cients of 
t he corr elati on of each elem ent of e t  wi t h t he corr espondi ng el em ent for anot her count r y.  For  each 
elem ent,   averaging over  t he corr elati on coeff i cients wi t h r espect  t o t hat   me mb e r ’ s part ners ( six i n t he 
UEMOA,   f our i n t he BEAC  r egion)  gi ves a m easure of  t he degree of  simi l ari t y of  bet w een shocks t o 
t hat  elem ent in t he i
t h  count r y and shocks i n i t s part ners.  Such  averages are show n i n t he r i ght - hand
colum ns of  Tabl es 3-4.   Av e r ages are show n f or  t he t wo   key elem ents of e t :   t he  i nnovat i ons  i n Dp  and
Dy.  The num ber of signi f i cant corr elati on coeff i cients (“+” for posi t i ve corr elati ons and “-” for 
negat i ve  ones)  i s show n  i n  parenthesi s.  I f   t here are bot h  signi f i cantl y  posi t i ve  and  signi f i cantl y  negat i ve 
corr elati on coeff i ci ents, the t erm “ mi xed” appears in parenthesi s. The r educed form e t   corr elati on 
averages are also not ed i n  t he  l eft - hand  colum ns  f or  com pari son.
Tabl es 5-6  show   simi l ar  average corr elati on  f i gures,  but   f or  t he  average corr elati on  bet w een a 
shock  t o  one  count r y  and  shocks  t o  count r i es i n  t he  ot her  m onet ary  uni on.   I f   t hese  are l arger  ( posi t i ve) 
num bers than i n Tabl es 3- 4,  then t he count r y i s in som e sense m ore simi l ar to t h e  me mb e r s of the 
ot her  uni on t han i t   i s t o i t s existi ng part ners.  I f   t he num bers are t he  sam e,  t hen  t he  count r y  i s as simi l ar 16
t o  t he  me mb e r s of  t he  ot her  uni on  as i t   i s t o  i t s existi ng  part ners.
4. 2  Infl at i on  i nnovat i on  correlat i on  coeff i cients
For   all   but   one of  t he CFA  me mb e r s,  t he averages of  t he pri ce i nnovat i on corr elati on coeff i cients are
qui t e l arge – mo s t l y around 0. 7 -  and signi f i cantl y di f f erent  f r om  zero.   ( A nd t hey are generall y bi gger 
t han t he corr elati on coeff i cients f r om  t he r educed-f orm  pri ce equat i on,   so a str uct ureless VAR  t ends 
t o underesti ma t e t he degree of  simi l ari t y i n pri ce shocks. )   I n ot her  wo r ds,   i f   we   put   a l ot   of  we i ght   on 
t he i m port ance of  i ni t i al  pri ce shocks i n assessing t he costs and benefi t s of  a m onet ary uni on,   and l ess 
we i ght   on  i ni t i al  i ncom e  shocks  or  on  t he  eventual   i m pact  of  a pri ce shock  on  t he  w hol e econom y,   t hen 
t he C FA  as a w hole com es out qui t e w ell .  Pr i ce shocks t end t o be qui t e highl y corr elated across 
me mb e r  states, and on average a m onetary pol i cy response based on t he average pri ce shock t o 
me mb e r   states i n one part i cular  peri od wi l l   be appropri ate  f or  all   count r i es i ndi vi dual l y.   Thi s concl usi on 
w oul d sti l l   be t r ue i f   pol i cy we r e we i ght ed t ow ards t he l argest   me mb e r s of  t he CFA  ( Cot e d’I voi r e i n 
t he UEMOA  and Ca me r oon i n t he BEAC  r egion).   As   show n i n Tabl e A3   i n A ppendi x 2,   t hese t wo  
count r i es’ pri ce innovat i on corr elati on coeff i cients w it h respect to t hei r  part ner states are all  around 
0. 9,   wi t h  t he  one  excepti on  di scussed bel ow .
Mo r eover,  t here is generall y no si gni f i cant di f f erence betw een a count r y’s average pri ce 
i nnovat i on corr elati on wi t h i t s existi ng part ners ( Tabl es 3-4)  and  t he  average wi t h  t he  me mb e r s of  t he 
ot her  m onet ary uni on ( Tabl es 5-6).   Ther e i s no part i cular  econom i c need f or  t he border  bet w een t he 
UEMOA  and  t he  BEAC  r egion:   a singl e m onet ary  uni on  w oul d  do  as we l l .
Ther e is how ever one count r y for wh i ch the average corr elati on coeff i cients are som ew hat 
l ow er than t he rest,  though st i l l  signi f i cantl y posi t i ve.  For  Ni ger the average corr elati on coeff i cient is 
about   0. 4.   Thi s i s a Sahel i an econom y  on  t he  nort hern  edge  of  t he  CFA  area wi t h  very  l i t t l e i n  t he  wa y  
of  i ndust r y or  mi neral  export s.  I n t he case of  Ni ger,   a m onet ary pol i cy r esponse t ail ored t o t he cross-
count r y average shock t o t he m onet ary uni on,  or t o t he shock i n i t s dom i nant  me mb e r ( s),  w oul d
t ypi call y  onl y  r oughl y  corr espond t o  t he  i deal  pol i cy f or  t he  count r y.
I f  i nfl ati on st abil i zati on i s the overr i di ng pol i cy goal ,  t hen t hese result s bear on t he t wo
quest i ons posed above.  Wi t h respect to t he fi r st quest i on:  there is no need for any border wi t hi n t he 
CFA,  since infl ati on i nnovat i on corr elati ons across t he UEMOA- BEAC  border  are as l arge as t hose 
wi t hi n each region.  Wi t h respect to t he second:  there is a singl e count r y (Ni ger)  for wh i ch infl ati on 
i nnovat i on  corr elati on  stati sti cs wi t h  t he  r est  of  t he  uni on  are l ess t han  0. 5.   These num bers cert ainl y  do 17
Table 3: UEMOA Countries’ Average Innovation Correlations with Rest of the 
Union
(Number and sign of significant correlations in parenthesis)
∆p reduced form ∆p structural model
ben  0.30 (3+)  0.61 (6+)
bfa  0.34 (5+)  0.66 (6+)
civ  0.31 (3+)  0.69 (6+)
sen  0.19 (2+)  0.68 (6+)
tgo  0.34 (4+)  0.70 (6+)
mli  0.08 (0+)  0.67 (6+)
ner  0.30 (3+)  0.39 (6+)
∆y reduced form ∆y structural model
ben -0.12 (2-)  0.07 (mixed)
bfa -0.03 (1-)  0.17 (mixed)
civ  0.01 (1-) -0.38 (mixed)
sen  0.07 (0+)  0.14 (mixed)
tgo  0.06 (1+)  0.14 (mixed)
mli  0.17 (1+) -0.40 (mixed)
ner  0.09 (0+)  0.17 (mixed)
Table 4: BEAC Countries’ Average Innovation Correlations with Rest of the 
Union
(Number and sign of significant correlations in parenthesis)
∆p reduced form ∆p structural model
cmr  0.26 (1+)  0.69 (4+)
cgo  0.25 (2+)  0.69 (4+)
gab  0.18 (1+)  0.69 (4+)
car  0.29 (3+)  0.69 (4+)
tcd  0.17 (1+)  0.51 (4+)
∆y reduced form ∆y structural model
cmr -0.01 (0+)  0.27 (mixed)
cgo -0.04 (1-) -0.64 (4-)
gab  0.07 (1+)  0.27 (mixed)
car  0.12 (1+)  0.25 (mixed)
tcd -0.14 (0+)  0.25 (mixed)
Table 5: UEMOA Countries’ Average Innovation Correlations with BEAC 
Countries
(Number and sign of significant correlations in parenthesis)
∆p reduced form ∆p structural model
ben  0.37 (3+)  0.74 (5+)
bfa  0.32 (2+)  0.79 (5+)
civ  0.37 (4+)  0.85 (5+)
sen  0.24 (2+)  0.87 (5+)
tgo  0.27 (2+)  0.84 (5+)
mli  0.20 (0+)  0.87 (5+)
ner  0.19 (1+)  0.35 (5+)
∆y reduced form ∆y structural model
ben -0.11 (mixed)  0.22 (mixed)
bfa  0.21 (1+)  0.38 (mixed)
civ  0.09 (1+) -0.34 (mixed)
sen -0.07 (0+)  0.29 (mixed)
tgo  0.28 (1+)  0.44 (mixed)
mli  0.16 (2+) -0.41 (mixed)
ner  0.05 (mixed)  0.38 (mixed)18
Table 6: BEAC Countries: Average Innovation Correlations with UEMOA 
Countries
(Number and sign of significant correlations in parenthesis)
∆p reduced form ∆p structural model
cmr  0.23 (1+)  0.78 (6+)
cgo  0.37 (3+)  0.81 (7+)
gab  0.21 (2+)  0.82 (7+)
car  0.37 (4+)  0.82 (7+)
tcd  0.23 (2+)  0.56 (6+)
∆y reduced form ∆y structural model
cmr  0.04 (1+)  0.26 (mixed)
cgo  0.09 (1+) -0.29 (mixed)
gab  0.03 (1-)  0.28 (mixed)
car  0.18 (mixed)  0.22 (mixed)
tcd  0.09 (mixed)  0.22 (mixed)
Table 7: Output Shock Correlations
Be n Bf aS e nT g o N e r C m r G a b C a r T c d     Ci v  Ml iC g o
Be n 1 0 . 47 0. 13 0. 56 0. 38 0. 52 0. 48 0. 31 0. 28 -0. 58 -0. 48 -0. 5
Bf a0 . 47 1 0. 68 0. 78 0. 76 0. 69 0. 84 0. 54 0. 67 -0. 73 -0. 77 -0. 83
Sen 0. 13 0. 68 1 0. 58 0. 79 0. 56 0. 63 0. 40 . 55 -0. 56 -0. 64 -0. 68
Tgo 0. 56 0. 78 0. 58       10 . 85 0. 81 0. 90 . 67 0. 77 -0. 87 -0. 93 -0. 93
Ne r 0 . 38 0. 76 0. 79 0. 85 1 0. 76 0. 82 0. 58 0. 65 -0. 8- 0. 83 -0. 9
Cmr 0. 52 0. 69 0. 56 0. 81 0. 76 1 0. 87 0. 62 0. 69 -0. 74 -0. 76 -0. 83
Ga b 0 . 48 0. 84 0. 63   0. 90 . 82 0. 87 1 0. 69 0. 75 -0. 82 -0. 88 -0. 93
Ca r 0 . 31 0. 54 0. 40 . 67 0. 58 0. 62 0. 69 1 0. 61 -0. 42 -0. 57 -0. 66
Tcd 0. 28 0. 67 0. 55 0. 77 0. 65 0. 69 0. 75 0. 61 1 -0. 61 -0. 79 -0. 8
Ci v- 0. 58 -0. 73 -0. 56 -0. 87 -0. 8- 0. 74 -0. 82 -0. 42 -0. 61 1 0. 86 0. 87
Ml i- 0. 48 -0. 77 -0. 64 -0. 93 -0. 83 -0. 76 -0. 88 -0. 57 -0. 79 0. 86 1 0. 94
Cgo - 0. 5- 0. 83 -0. 68 -0. 93 -0. 9- 0. 83 -0. 93 -0. 66 -0. 80 . 87 0. 94 1
not   r epresent  an overwh e l mi ng case f or  Ni ger  qui t t i ng t he CFA,   but   t hey do suggest   t hat   t he benefi t s 
of CF A me mb e r ship for t hi s count r y need t o be part i cularl y l arge for t hei r  me mb e r ship t o be
wo r t hw hi l e. For  the rest of the CFA ,  infl ati on i nnovat i on corr elati on st ati sti cs are all  very hi gh,  so 
a s y mme t r y  of  pri ce shocks  shoul d  not   be  a cause f or  concern.
4. 3  Ou t put   i nnovat i on  correlat i on  coeff i cients
The corr elati on coeff i cients for str uct ural innovat i ons t o i ncom e grow t h are rather di f f erent.  In bot h 
t h e  UEMOA a n d  t he BEA C region t here are som e signi f i cantl y negat i ve  and som e si gni f i cantl y 
posi t i ve coeff i cients f or  wi t hi n- uni on shocks ( Tabl es 3-4).   The  f ul l   corr elati on  ma t r i x  i s show n  i n  Tabl e 
7,   wh i ch show s t he  source of  t hi s asym m etr y.   Ther e are t wo   groups  of  CFA  count r i es wi t hi n  wh i ch all  
t he coeff i cients are signi f i cantl y posi t i ve,  and bet w een w hich all  t he coeff i cients are signi f i cantl y19
negat i ve.   The  t wo   groups  are:
( i )B e n i n,   Bur ki na  Faso,   Senegal ,   Togo,   Ni ger,   Ca me r oon,   G abon,   Ce nt r afr i que,   Cha d
( i i )C o t e d’I voi r e,  Ma l i ,   Congo Republ i c
Wi t hi n  t hese  groups,   t he  corr elati on  coeff i cients are mo s t l y  i n  t he  r ange  0. 5  t o  0. 9;   bet w een t he  groups,  
t he corr elati on coeff i cients are m ostl y i n t he range –0. 5  t o –0. 9.   The  second,   sm all er  group cont ains 
t he t wo  mo s t  indebt e d  UEMOA me mb e r s: Cot e d’I voi r e, and i t s econom i call y sm al l  nei ghbor Ma l i ,  
wh i ch li es on t he nort hern border of Cot e d’I voi r e and provi des t he Ivori an econom y w i t h m any 
mi grant  wo r kers.  I t   i s not   enti r ely surpri sing t hat   Cot e d’I voi r e and i t s nort hern satell i t e shoul d exhi bi t
som e simi l ari t y i n t erms  o f  shocks t o aggregate suppl y and aggregate dem and,  and di f f er fr om  t he 
ot her  me mb e r s of  t hei r   m onet ary  uni on.
I t  i s m ore surpri sing t hat  t he t hi r d  me mb e r  of t he group i s Congo Republ i c, a petr ol eum
export er a n d  BEAC me mb e r  at the sout hern edge of the CFA .  It  is dif f i cult  to see w hy Congo’s 
aggregate suppl y shocks shoul d exhi bi t  mo r e simi l ari t y w i t h Cot e d’I voi r e than w i t h G abon and
Ca me r oon.  The f eatures that  Congo has i n com m on w i t h t he ot her count r i es in group (i i )  are a high
debt   l evel  and a l ow  r eli ance on t r ade t axes f or  governm ent   expendi t ure ( see Tabl e 1).   I n t he l i ght   of 
t he di scussion endi ng Secti on 3. 1,   i t   ma y   be t hat   t hese f eatures r efl ect  a com m onal i t y i n t he nat ure of 
shocks  t o  aggregate dem and.
I n t he absence o f  int erest rate data it  has not  been possibl e to i dent i f y aggregate dem and 
shocks separately f r om  aggregate suppl y shocks:   t he esti ma t ed i nnovat i ons i n Dy are t he sum  of  bot h 
t oget her.   On e   i nt erpretati on of  t he r esult s here i s t hat   aggregate dem and shocks dom i nat e aggregate 
suppl y shocks ( ot herwi se we   shoul d see com m onal i t y i n t he shocks t o Dy  i n  t he  pet r ol eum  export ers),  
and t hat  t he nat ure of aggregate dem and shocks i s li nked t o i ndebt edness.  Th e  VAR mo d e l i ng
f r am ew ork i s not   we l l   suit ed t o pi cking out   t he  str uct ure of  such l i nks,   but   suggest s a pot enti all y  f r ui t f ul  
l i ne of com plem entary count r y-specif i c research int o t he l i nks bet w een fi scal pol i cy and aggregate 
dem and  shocks.
Ne v e r t hel ess,  t he  r esult s here suggest   t hat   i f   we   put   a l ot   of  we i ght   on  t he  i m port ance of  i ni t i al 
out put  shocks i n assessing t he cost s and benefi t s of a m onet ary uni on,  t hen t he CFA  shoul d be 
r eorgani zed. It  w oul d be m ore appropri ate for Cot e d’I voi r e and M ali  to form  one m onet ary uni on 
( possibl y j oi ned by Congo Republ i c),   and f or  t he ot her  existi ng CFA  me mb e r s t o j oi n t oget her  t o f orm 
anot her.  If  th e  CFA we r e divi ded i n t hi s w ay then t here w oul d be no “out l i er” count r y i n t erms  o f  
out put  innovat i on corr elati on st ati sti cs, wi t h t he possi bl e excepti on of Be ni n.  Wi t h t he excepti on of 
Be ni n,  all  of the count r i es in t he t w o hypot het i cal groups have l arge and posi t i ve out put  innovat i on 
corr elati ons wi t h t hei r   hypot het i cal  part ners.  For   Be ni n t he corr elati on stati sti cs are som ew hat  sm all er,  
t hough  sti l l   posi t i ve,   and  t he  r em arks  about   Ni ger  ma d e   above  appl y  also t o  Be ni n,   i f   out put   stabil i zati on 
i s an i m port ant  pol i cy goal .20
4. 4  Long  run  i m pul se responses
The  i nforma t i on  i n  Tabl es 3-7  r elates t o  t he  characteri sti cs of  str uct ural  shocks  t o  t he  econom ies of  t he 
CFA.  In a w orl d w here m onet ary aut hori t i es r espond i n a t i me l y wa y   t o pri ce and out put   shocks t o 
t hei r   econom i es t he l ong r un eff ect  of  shocks i s not   of  i mme d i ate concern:   t he shock wi l l   have been 
steri l i zed before it s long run eff ect is reali zed. In a w orl d w here m onet ary aut hori t i es are slow er  t o 
r espond t hi s is no l onger tr ue,  and w e m ust  exam ine t he i m pact of pri ce and out put  shocks on t he 
econom i c system  over  a l onger  t i me   hori zon.
Us i ng t he st r uct ural VAR we  h a v e  e s t i ma t ed, it  is possibl e to draw  an im pul se response 
f unct i on for t he i m pact of each shock on each vari able in each of the 12 count r i es. Ra t her than 
r eproduci ng  all   of  t hese  chart s,  we   wi l l   f ocus  on  t he  asym pt ot i c eff ect  of  each shock  on  each vari able. 
Tabl e 8 s u mma r i zes t he i nforma t i on i n t he i m pul se r esponse f unct i ons by  l i sti ng  t he  l ong  r un  r esponses 
t o each shock, i. e.,  the t ot al area underneath each im pul se response curve.  The poi nt s w e have t o 
ma k e   bel ow  w oul d not   be subst anti all y alt ered i f   we   i nst ead r eport ed f i gures f or  t he areas bel ow  t he 
i m pul se r esponse  curves  up t o  a f i ni t e t i me   hori zon.
Table 8: Long Run Impulse Responses (Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
            p on p               p on y              y on y
   ben                0.73 (0.61)          0.31 (0.44)         0.20 (0.14)
   bfa      0.28 (0.35)          0.17 (0.19)         0.21 (0.06)
   civ                0.16 (0.27) -0.04 (0.38)         0.18 (0.18)
   sen                0.32 (0.24) -0.08 (0.11)         0.13 (0.13)
   tgo                0.34 (1.35)          1.49 (0.32)         0.40 (0.28)
   mli                0.13 (2.37) -0.15 (1.76)         0.16 (1.05)
   ner                0.10 (0.17)          0.03 (0.63)         0.23 (3.44)
   cmr                0.08 (0.42)          0.21 (0.34)         0.25 (0.36)
   cgo                0.12 (0.22) -0.17 (0.32)         0.13 (0.29)
   gab                0.23 (2.72)          0.25 (1.97)         0.33 (0.62)
   car                0.21 (1.06) -0.01 (0.70)         0.19 (0.17)
   tcd                0.15 (0.11) -0.17 (0.28)         0.48 (1.28)
So Tabl e 8 show s t he l ong run eff ects on each econom y of bot h a uni t  shock t o i nfl ati on and a uni t  
shock t o out put   grow t h.   Gi ven t he str uct ure of  our  m odel ,   i nfl ati on shocks have a l ong r un i m pact  on 
bot h pri ces and out put ,   wh e r eas out put   grow t h  shocks  have  an eff ect  onl y  on  pri ces,  so t here are t hree 
colum ns of fi gures in Tabl e 8.
14 The f i gures show  t he eventual  i m pact of a one-peri od shock t o 
i nfl ati on and out put   grow t h on t he l evel  of  pri ces and out put ;   f or  exam ple,  a f i gure of  0. 1 i mp l i es t hat  
t he  l evel  wi l l   i ncrease by  10% .
The mos t  str i ki ng aspect of Tabl e 8 is the l arge cross-count r y vari ance in t he est i ma t ed 
i m pul se responses.  It  is tr ue t hat  the l ong run eff ects of infl ati on shocks on i nfl ati on,  and of out put
14  The  t hree  sets of  l ong  run  i m pul se responses  are  equi val ent  t o  t he  elem ents  C22,C 32 and C 33 i n  equat i on  ( 12).  21
grow t h  shocks  on  out put   grow t h,   are all   posi t i ve,   and  t hat   t he  l ong  r un  eff ect  of  a shock  i s sm all er  t han 
t he i ni t i al im pact:  all  the fi gures in t he fi r st and t hi r d col um ns of Tabl e 8 are in t he i nt erval  [0, 1].  
Ho we v e r ,  the si ze of the i nfl ati on eff ect vari es bet w een 0. 08 ( Ca me r oon)  and 0. 73 ( Be ni n),   and t he 
size of  t he out put   grow t h eff ect  vari es bet w een 0. 13 ( Senegal ,   Congo Republ i c)  and 0. 48 ( Cha d) .   I n 
som e count r i es the i ni t i al shock i s qui ckly di ssipat ed, so that  the l ong run eff ect on t he l evel of the
vari able i s very sm all ;   i n ot hers,  t he r ate of  di ssipat i on i s mu c h   slow er,   so t he l ong r un eff ect  i s qui t e 
l arge.  I f  m onet ary aut hori t i es responded t o shocks onl y aft er a considerable delay, r esponse
appropri ate in each count r y w oul d vary w i del y across t he Fr anc Zone.   I n ot her  wo r ds,   t he costs of 
CFA  me mb e r ship i n t erms   of  l ost   m onet ary autonom y wi l l   be mu c h   l arger  t han i n a wo r l d wh e r e t he 
m onet ary  r esponse  t o  a shock  i s i mme d i ate.
Thi s concl usi on i s r einforced by t he f i gures i n t he second colum n of  Tabl e 8,   wh i ch show s  t he 
l ong r un eff ect  of  an i nfl ati on shock on out put .   As   not ed i n t he di scussion of  equat i on ( 5)  t hi s eff ect,  
[c1 -  c2￿f 1]/[1 - c2￿f 1], can in t heory be posi t i ve or negat i ve.  Tabl e 8 indi cates that  bot h cases are 
possibl e, wi t h fi gures rangi ng f r om  –0. 17 ( Congo Republ i c)  t o +1. 49 ( Togo).   The  standard err ors on 
t he l ong run i m pul se responses are generall y qui t e large,  since w e have not  i m posed any over-
i dent i f yi ng r estr i cti ons on t he m odel ;   how ever,   t here are signi f i cant  di f f erences across t he  count r i es i n 
our  sam ple.
15  Wi t h t hi s degree of  l ong r un het erogenei t y,   t he costs of  CFA  me mb e r ship wi t h sluggi sh 
m onet ary  pol i cy r esponses  wi l l   be  even greater.
5.   S u mma r y   and  Conc l usi on
The  t wo   m onet ary uni ons t hat   ma k e   up t he CFA  Fr anc Zone i n cont i nent al  Af r i ca r epresent,   at  l east 
pot enti all y,  an alt ernat i ve w ay of achieving a “hard” curr ency peg that  em bodi es som ew hat mo r e 
f l exibi l i t y t han a curr ency board.   On e   of  t he pot enti al  costs of  me mb e r ship ari ses f r om  t he need f or  all  
count r i es i n a mo n e t ary uni on  t o  pursue a singl e m onet ary  pol i cy.  So  t he  size of  t hese  costs depends  on 
t he degree of simi l ari t y across the count r i es in shocks t o m acroeconom i c vari ables im port ant to t he 
pol i cym aker,  and i n t he degree of simi l ari t y i n t he l ong run i m pact t hat  t he shocks have on t he 
econom y.
The  paper  f ocuses on t he i dent i f i cati on of  shocks t o i nfl ati on and out put   grow t h,   condi t i oni ng 
on com m on foreign pri ce shocks and on m oney suppl y grow t h,  t he evol ut i on of wh i ch is not
i ndependent   of  uni on me mb e r ship.   The  me t hod used t o i dent i f y t he shocks i s based on t he me t hod of 
Bl anchard and Q uah (1989),  but  em ploys a l arger m acroeconom i c m odel  wi t h di f f erent theoreti cal 
r estr i cti ons  t han  i n  t he  t r adit i onal   Bl anchard-Qu a h   f r am ew ork.
Ther e is a large and posi t i ve degree of corr elati on bet w een i nfl ati on shocks t o t he di f f erent 
15  The  standard  err ors are calculated by  t he  me t hod  of  Lut kepohl   ( 1993,   secti on  3. 7).I f   i ndi vi dual l y  i nsi gni f i cant 
r egressors are r em oved  f r om   t he  unrestr i cted VAR  t hen  t he  standard  err ors i n  Tabl e 8  are mu c h   sm all er,   but   t he 
esti ma t ed  l ong  r un  i m pul se r esponses  are  very  simi l ar.22
me mb e r s of  t he CFA.   So  i f   t he pol i cy r esponse t o i nfl ati on shocks i s i mme d i ate,  and i nfl ati on i s all   t hat  
ma t t ers,  t he cost  of  CFA  me mb e r ship i s unl i kel y t o be l arge.   I ndeed,  t he corr elati on of  i nfl ati on  shocks 
across t he t wo   m onet ary uni ons i n t he CFA  i s as hi gh as t he corr elati ons wi t hi n t hem ,   so t here i s no 
part i cular  advant age t o havi ng t wo   curr encies r ather  t han j ust   t he one.   On e   possibl e excepti on t o t hi s 
general concl usi on i s N iger,  w hose corr elati on coeff i cients, though posi t i ve,  are less than 0. 5.  Ni ger 
has  som e r eason t o  quest i on  wh e t her  t he  possibl e benefi t s of  CFA  me mb e r ship  are wo r t h  t he  cost  of  a 
com m on  CFA  m onet ary  pol i cy t hat   i s unl i kel y  t o  r efl ect  i t s needs t hat   closel y.
The pi cture w it h r egard t o shocks t o out put  grow t h i s rather di f f erent.  Ther e are w it hi n t he 
CFA  t wo   groups of  count r i es wi t hi n wh i ch out put   grow t h shocks are hi ghl y posi t i vel y corr elated,  but  
bet w een w hich out put  grow t h shocks are negat i vel y corr elated. Si nce these t wo  g r oups do not  
corr espond t o t he t wo  e x i sti ng m onet ary uni ons t here m ay be a reason to redraw  the i nt ernal
boundari es of  t he  Fr anc Zone,   i f   t he  pol i cym aker  i s part i cularl y  concerned  about   out put   grow t h  shocks.  
I f  the borders w ere to be redraw n, then out put  correlati on coeff i cients wi t hi n each of  t he t wo   new  
uni ons w oul d be l arge and posi t i ve for all  count r i es except Be ni n.  Be ni n’s posi t i on w i t h respect to 
out put   shocks  w oul d  r esem ble Ni ger’ s posi t i on  wi t h  r espect  t o  pri ce shocks.
I f   t he pol i cym aker  i s unabl e t o  r espond  i mme d i ately  t o  i nfl ati on  and  out put   grow t h  shocks,   t hen 
t he  degree of  simi l ari t y  i n  t he  l ong  r un  i m pact  of  shocks  on  t he  econom y  i n  di f f erent  count r i es becom es 
i m port ant.   He r e t he pi cture of  t he CFA  i s l ess att r acti ve,   wi t h a consi derable degree of  het erogenei t y 
i n t he i mp a c t   of  shocks across t he Fr anc Zone.   I f   shocks t o t he Zone  are not   i mme d i ately off set  by a 
m onet ary pol i cy response t hen t hei r  eff ect wi l l  vary subst anti all y acro s s  me mb e r  states, wi t h no
obvi ous  com m on  pol i cy r esponse  appropri at e t o  all .
The  concl usi ons here are condi t i onal   on t he wa y   t he m onet ary authori t i es i n t he CFA  conduct  
t hei r   pol i cy.  I n order  t o arr i ve at  categori cal  concl usi ons we   need t o know  mo r e about   t he pol i t i cal  and 
econom i c constr aint s faced by C FA  poli cym akers, and  on t he pol i t i cal  econom y of  pol i cy f orma t i on.  
Evi dence fr om  previous st udi es suggest s that  the exi sti ng fr am ew ork for the conduct  of fi scal and 
m onet ary pol i cy wi t hi n t he Fr anc Zone i s not   opt i ma l .   I f   CFA  me mb e r ship i s t o be of  any wo r t h,   t hese 
probl em s need to be addressed. The m essage of thi s paper is that  tackli ng t hem  i s a w ort hw hi l e 
enterpri se.  The  CFA  i s,  on  t he  w hol e,  and  assum ing  t hat   i t   has  t he  abil i t y  t o  conduct   t i me l y  stabil i zati on 
pol i cy,  hom ogeneous  enough  f or  a m onet ary  uni on  t o  wo r k.
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